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Deficit Policies, Deficit Fallacies 
Preston J. Miller, Assistant Vice President 
Research Department 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
More than Mount Saint Helens went up in smoke this 
summer. The hope for a balanced budget in fiscal 1981 
was also reduced to ashes as a recession emerged and 
sentiment for a tax cut grew. Since the recession has 
spoiled the hope for a balanced budget anyway, econo-
mists have advised both Democrats and Republicans 
that taxes should be cut to get the economy moving. 
They seem to think that adding $30 billion to the 
federal deficit in fiscal 1981 will have virtually no 
impact on inflation. I disagree. The proposed tax cuts 
will result in less revenue for the government year in 
and year out and will thus be inflationary. This infla-
tionary policy is particularly unfortunate because a 
change in policy toward a balanced budget could re-
duce inflation at little real cost.
1 
Deficits cause inflation 
The proposed tax cuts could be interpreted as a con-
tinuation of the deficit policies that the United States 
has had for many years. The federal government has 
had 19 annual budget deficits in the last 20 years. Its 
practice has been to run deficits in all phases of the 
business cycle, when unemployment is high and when 
it is low. When the federal government runs these 
repeated deficits, it simply prints and sells more bonds. 
This means that the amount of outstanding bonds in-
creases every year. Reasonably enough, few people 
expect the government to retire its debt. Because the 
bonds are not likely to be paid off by higher taxes in the 
future, they are merely promises to deliver currency in 
the future. In fact, they are really much like currency. 
They, like currency, are pieces of paper backed by 
nothing —not by tangible assets, not by future taxes. 
Nevertheless, as long as the government limits the sup-
ply of bonds, they are valued fiat paper that adds to the 
nominal wealth of the private sector. They are, in most 
essentials, a part of our ever-expanding money supply.
2 
When bonds are almost identical to money, any 
change in policy that increases the deficit is inflation-
ary. As is well understood, government can cause in-
flation by printing more money. It can also cause infla-
tion by printing more bonds. Additions to the stocks of 
money or bonds, by increasing the total amount of 
nominal wealth, increase private demands for goods 
and services. The increased demands, in turn, push up 
the prices of goods. The average price level will keep 
rising as long as the government continues to follow a 
practice of running large deficits. 
The data strongly suggest that a change in policy 
toward larger deficits causes more inflation. Although 
the United States has had a practice of running budget 
deficits for 20 years, there is statistical evidence that 
federal deficit policy changed between the 1960s and 
the 1970s. The accumulated federal budget deficit (the 
stock of interest-bearing and noninterest-bearing fed-
eral government debt) expanded much faster in the 
1970s than in the 1960s. When this country followed a 
policy of higher deficits, it experienced higher inflation, 
as the chart shows. 
1 This paper is essentially a sequel to Miller and Struthers 1980, and some of 
the arguments are more fully developed in the earlier paper. 
2The notion that unbacked bonds act much like fiat money has appeared 
often in the literature. Samuelson, for instance, states, "Interest-bearing public 
bonds, which correspond to no government capital formation and which no 
taxpayer rationally expects to have to help retire in his lifetime, have effects 
similar to those of the noninterest IOUs we call M [money ]" (1964, p. 342). 
This point is made also in Bryant and Wallace 1979, Christ 1957, and Martins 
1980. 
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atically reduce the average deficit. It would, therefore, 
reduce the rate of growth of fiat paper and thus reduce 
inflation, even though deficits would occasionally occur 
because of business downturns. Of course, balancing 
the budget in 1981 or any other single year would not 
necessarily reduce inflation. One balanced budget out 
of many years of deficits is hardly meaningful. A policy 
of balancing the budget on average over the business 
cycle, however, could significantly reduce inflation. 
Why is it, then, that some people see little, if any, 
relationship between inflation and deficits?
3 It is be-
cause they fail to distinguish between the effects of dif-
ferent deficit policies and the effects of different eco-
nomic conditions. 
Under a given policy, in which tax rates and ex-
penditures do not change, lower inflation rates generally 
go along with higher deficits. This happens because of 
economic conditions. Under a given policy, an eco-
nomic downturn, for instance, typically causes deficits 
to rise and inflation to fall. High deficits and low 
inflation may thus coincide, but this does not mean that 
one caused the other. The downturn, in fact, caused 
both. Under different policies, however, the situation is 
reversed: lower inflation rates generally go along with 
lower deficits. If we were to compare two identical 
economies which differed only with respect to deficit 
policies, inflation would always be lower in the one with 
the low-deficit policy than in the one with the high-
deficit policy. This means that, over a period of years, 
we would expect inflation in any particular economy to 
be lowest under the policy of the lowest deficits. 
How Fast and How Costly? 
To begin to solve its inflation problem, the United 
States needs to move toward a policy of lower deficits 
over the course of the business cycle. Such a policy, 
once it is understood, has a psychological effect, be-
cause people expect lower deficits and lower inflation 
in the future. This change in psychology, in expecta-
tions, will change behavior immediately, not just in the 
distant future, because economic behavior depends 
vitally on what people expect in the future. This change 
is not just symbolic, and it is not just a consideration 
for the long term. 
There is historical evidence that tighter budget poli-
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The Importance of Policy 
The key word here is policy. A budget policy is a 
strategy followed consistently so that people come to 
understand it. It is a rule which describes how tax rates 
and expenditures are to be set in each year based on 
the economic conditions of the previous year and, per-
haps, earlier years. A simple policy, for example, 
would be to set tax rates and expenditures for all time. 
Policy must be distinguished from result. The result 
is the numerical budget deficit or surplus which occurs 
in a given year. It depends not only on the policy, but 
on current economic conditions. An identical policy 
governing tax rates and expenditures could lead to 
quite different budget deficits in different years, de-
pending on such things as the weather, a war, buyers' 
tastes, or the ups and downs of the business cycle. 
An appropriate deficit policy is extremely important 
for controlling inflation. Suppose, for instance, that 
the policy governing tax rates and expenditures in the 
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years were all offset by surpluses in the fat years during 
each business cycle. Such a policy would system- 3See, for example, Perry 1978, pp. 279-81, and Schlesinger 1980. 
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cies have quickly reduced inflation.
4 The clearest breaks 
in government budget policies have occurred after wars 
or after years of hyperinflation. In these cases, gov-
ernments typically announce major changes in policy 
which the public understands. After the U.S. Civil 
War, the government discontinued deficit financing 
and inflation quickly subsided. The hyperinflations in 
Germany after World War I and in five other Euro-
pean countries throughout this century were all cor-
rected by drastic changes in government policy, changes 
that produced lower deficits. 
Furthermore, when changes in policy are clear-cut, 
their cost in terms of lost output is not nearly as high as 
has been suggested. After the Civil War, output in the 
United States grew well, despite the changes in policy 
and the resultant sharp drops in inflation. In Germany 
and the other European countries, the cost (in terms of 
lost output) of eliminating inflation was about the same 
as that of one ordinary recession in the business cycle. 
Even if a change to tighter budget policies in the 
current U.S. economy should happen to be poorly 
understood, the cost of reducing inflation would not be 
crippling. The oft-heard estimates of the cost—like the 
estimate that reducing inflation one percentage point 
would cost $200 billion in lost output—simply are not 
credible, because they all assume there is a stable 
trade-off between inflation and real output which is 
independent of policy.
5 Without any question, this is a 
false assumption. If there is anything economists are 
sure of, it is that the relationship between inflation and 
output is not stable.
6 Moreover, whatever the relation-
ship may be, it cannot be exploited by government 
budget policies.
7 We can't increase output by deliber-
ately creating inflation, and we won't necessarily lose 
output by deliberately reducing inflation. 
A tightening in budget policy could have a small 
initial cost, as it penalizes people who contract based 
on expectations of continuing inflation. But the more 
the policy is understood, the smaller the errors people 
will make in their expectations and the lower this cost 
will be. In fact, it is possible that a well-announced and 
well-designed policy would have no real cost at all. 
According to at least one careful study, U.S. data 
suggest that an understood tightening in deficit policy 
would lower inflation without affecting output.
8 In no 
case would a tighter deficit policy produce the apoca-
lyptic results foreseen by those who assume that there 
is a fixed trade-off between inflation and output. 
If we want to reduce inflation—without severe hard-
ship—we can do so by designing a concerted and 
reasonable policy to balance the federal budget on 
average, or at least to lower the budget deficit, over 
the course of the business cycle. That is, we need to 
change policies; we need to stop running continuous 
deficits and start regularly balancing the budget. 
4This section on the evidence is based on Sargent forthcoming. 
5This estimate can be found in Okun 1978, p. 520. 
6See McNees 1978. 
7This argument is made more completely in Lucas 1972 and in the article by 
Thomas J. Sargent in this Quarterly Review. 
8See Barro 1980. 
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